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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4496 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY KNOBBS, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00706-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 9, 2015 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 17, 2015) 
 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Jeffrey Knobbs appeals the order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dated November 6, 2014, revoking his supervised 
release and sentencing him to twelve months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ 
supervised release.  Knobbs’s counsel has moved to withdraw under Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Knobbs’s appeal contains no nonfrivolous 
issues.  We will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the order of the District Court.1 
I. 
 In March 2010, Knobbs pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c), a class C felony.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (defining class C felony).  Knobbs was sentenced to twenty-four 
months’ imprisonment, fined $1,000, and assigned a special assessment of $100.  Knobbs 
was also assigned a term of three years’ supervised release, to be completed after his 
prison term, during which, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), he was prohibited from 
“commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime.”  J.A. 5.  While on supervised 
release, however, Knobbs was arrested and charged in state court with burglary, criminal 
trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal mischief for 
selling cases of beer stolen from his employer, a beer distributor.  As a result, Knobbs’s 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction to revoke Knobbs’s term of supervised release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
 
 3 
 
probation officer filed a petition with the District Court charging Knobbs with a violation 
of his supervised release.  After the state court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for 
nolle prosequi, the District Court held a violation hearing, at which Knobbs admitted to 
the charged violations.  The District Court subsequently revoked Knobbs’s term of 
supervised release and sentenced him to a new term of twelve months’ imprisonment and 
three years’ supervised release.  Knobbs timely appealed, which was followed by 
counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders.  Knobbs did not submit a pro se brief 
in response.  
II. 
 Our Court conducts a two-step inquiry when deciding whether to grant an Anders 
motion.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  In doing so, we 
exercise plenary review.  Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012).  We 
consider both (1) whether counsel has adequately fulfilled the requirements of Local 
Appellate Rule 109.2(a) by (a) “satisfy[ing] the [C]ourt that counsel has thoroughly 
examined the record in search of appealable issues” and (b) “explain[ing] why the issues 
are frivolous,” and (2) “whether an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  
 Here, counsel has ably discharged his duty under Anders to scour the record and to 
explain why no issues for appeal are nonfrivolous.  Counsel’s brief thoroughly explains 
                                                                                                                                                  
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).   
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that (1) the District Court’s revocation of Knobbs’s supervised release and subsequent 
imposition of twelve months’ imprisonment was proper; (2) the District Court’s 
imposition of an additional term of supervised release was proper; and (3) the revocation 
proceeding comported with the due process requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  We discuss each of these issues in turn. 
 First, a court may revoke a term of supervised release and, after considering 
certain sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, order the defendant to serve 
additional prison time “if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised release[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  At the 
revocation hearing, Knobbs admitted to the charged violations.  That admission, along 
with the absence of countervailing evidence, is sufficient to satisfy the preponderance 
standard required by § 3583(e)(3).  See United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 223 (3d 
Cir. 1992).   
 As to the length of the imposed prison term, a court may sentence a defendant to 
“[no] more than [two] years in prison if [the offense that resulted in the term of 
supervised release] is a class C or D felony.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  Because Knobbs’s 
original conviction was a Class C felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C), the twelve-month prison term imposed by the District Court was within 
the applicable statutory range.  The imposed prison term was also within the advisory 
range under the policy statements set forth in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
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See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4.  At the revocation hearing, the parties stipulated that the charged 
violation was a Grade B as defined in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1.2  Together with Knobbs’s 
Criminal History Category of II, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), the applicable advisory range 
under the Sentencing Guidelines was six to twelve months’ imprisonment.  U.S.S.G. § 
7B1.4.  As such, the twelve-month prison term imposed by the District Court was within 
the applicable advisory range.   
 Moreover, the record clearly demonstrates that the District Court, when sentencing 
Knobbs, “gave meaningful consideration to [the] factors” set forth in § 3553(a).  United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Section 3553(a) instructs a sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the nature and 
circumstances of offense, the need for the sentence imposed, and the range and kinds of 
sentences available.  Here, the District Court heard detailed presentations from defense 
counsel, the Government, a probation officer, and a witness about the nature of Knobbs’s 
charged violation of supervised release, engaged Knobbs in a lengthy colloquy about his 
decision to burgle his employer, and explained its view that the charged offense was 
particularly egregious because Knobbs breached the trust of the employer who employed 
                                              
 2 The violation petition submitted to the District Court for a revocation of 
Knobbs’s term of supervised release listed Knobbs’s charged violations—burglary and 
related offenses—as Grade A as defined in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1.  However, during the 
revocation hearing, both parties, in determining the appropriate sentence, stipulated that 
the violation was Grade B, and not Grade A, because the burglary involved a commercial 
establishment, not a dwelling, and thus was not a crime of violence.  
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him after he was released from prison.  Furthermore, as discussed above, the District 
Court adequately considered both “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
established for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines” and “any pertinent policy statement.”  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (5).  Accordingly, an appeal on the basis of the District 
Court’s revocation of Knobbs’s supervised release and subsequent imposition of twelve 
months’ imprisonment would be frivolous. 
 Second, the District Court’s imposition of an additional term of supervised release 
was proper.  A court may impose an additional term of supervised release, to be 
completed after a term of imprisonment resulting from a revocation of supervised release, 
so long as “[t]he length of such a term . . . [does] not exceed the term of supervised 
release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of 
supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of 
supervised release.”  Id. § 3583(h).  Under Knobbs’s original conviction, the District 
Court could have imposed a term of supervised release up to life.  See United States v. 
Sanchez-Gonzalez, 294 F.3d 563, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that § 3583 imposes no 
limit on the term of supervised release available for convictions under § 841(b)(1)(C)).  
Thus, the District Court’s imposition of three years’ supervised release fell within the 
applicable statutory range, and any appeal on the basis of the imposed term of supervised 
release would be frivolous. 
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 Third, the revocation proceeding comported with the due process requirements set 
forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Rule 32.1(b) requires the court to “hold 
the revocation hearing within a reasonable time” and that the person whose supervised 
release is being revoked shall be given “(A) written notice of the alleged violation; (B) 
disclosure of the evidence against the person; (C) an opportunity to appear, present 
evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest 
of justice does not require the witness to appear; (D) notice of the person’s right to retain 
counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; and 
(E) an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation.”  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32.1(b).  Here, Knobbs was provided with written notice of the alleged 
violations, which also disclosed the evidence against him; he appeared at the revocation 
hearing represented by counsel; and he was given the opportunity to present evidence and 
question adverse witnesses.  As Knobbs was afforded sufficient due process for his 
revocation hearing, any appeal on this basis would be frivolous.  See Barnhart, 980 F.2d 
at 222-24. 
 In sum, counsel’s twenty-three page brief thoroughly analyzes the numerous 
issues that could have been mounted on appeal, and our independent review of the record 
reveals no other nonfrivolous issues for consideration on appeal.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 
300; Simon, 679 F.3d at 114.  Therefore, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion and 
affirm the order of the District Court. 
